Climate Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon by Moyer, Elisabeth et al.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2013
Climate Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers
of Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon
Elisabeth Moyer
Mark D. Woolley
Michael J. Glotter
David A. Weisbach
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elisabeth Moyer, Mark D. Woolley, Michael J. Glotter & David A. Weisbach, "Climate Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of
Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 652, 2013).
 CHICAGO 
COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 652 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of 
Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon 
 
Elisabeth J. Moyer, Mark D. Woolley, Michael J. Glotter, and  
David A. Weisbach 
 
 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
August 2013 
For final published version, see Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 43(2), pp. 401–425 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The University of Chicago, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper Series Index: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
Climate impacts on economic growth as drivers of
uncertainty in the social cost of carbon
E.J. Moyer · M.D. Woolley · M.J. Glotter ·
D.A. Weisbach
Jul. 31, 2013
Submitted to Climatic Change
Abstract One of the central ways that the costs of global warming are incorporated
into U.S. law is in cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations. In 2010, to standardize
analyses, an Interagency Working Group (IAWG) established a central estimate of
the social cost of carbon (SCC) of $21/tCO2 drawn from three commonly-used mod-
els of climate change and the global economy. These models produced a relatively
narrow distribution of SCC values, consistent with previous studies. We use one of
the IAWG models, DICE, to explore which assumptions produce this apparent ro-
bustness. SCC values are constrained by a shared feature of model behavior: though
climate damages become large as a fraction of economic output, they do not sig-
nificantly alter economic trajectories. This persistent growth is inconsistent with the
widely held belief that climate change may have strongly detrimental effects to hu-
man society. The discrepancy suggests that the models may not capture the full range
of possible consequences of climate change. We examine one possibility untested by
any previous study, that climate change may directly affect productivity, and find that
even a modest impact of this type increases SCC estimates by many orders of mag-
nitude. Our results imply that the SCC is far more uncertain than shown in previous
modeling exercises and highly sensitive to assumptions. Understanding the societal
impact of climate change requires understanding not only the magnitude of losses at
any given time but also how those losses may affect future economic growth.
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1 Introduction
One of the central ways that the costs of global warming are incorporated into U.S. law
is through the use of the social cost of carbon (SCC) – the present-value cost of an ad-
ditional ton of CO2 emissions – in cost-benefit analysis. Federal agencies are required
by executive order to assess the costs and the benefits of each significant regulation.
In 2009, in an effort to standardize analyses, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) convened representatives from 12 agencies to participate in an Interagency
Working Group on the social cost of carbon (IAWG). The IAWG based their study
on three simple, commonly-used integrated assessment models (IAMs) that repre-
sent the effects of climate change on the global economy – DICE (Nordhaus, 2008),
FUND (Anthoff et al, 2009), and PAGE (Hope, 2006) – and so provides a useful
framework for examining issues in modeling the cost of climate change. The models
were tuned to match the same socioeconomic scenarios and climate sensitivities, and
were used to predict economic trajectories in the baseline case and with one additional
ton of CO2. The SCC is computed as the present value difference in consumption be-
tween the two cases. The IAWG’s central SCC estimate (IAWG, 2010) must be used
in cost-benefit analysis of any regulation that affects carbon dioxide emissions.
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Fig. 1: Distribution of 2010 IAWG SCC estimates from all three models, for a 3%
discount rate. Data were digitized from Figure A8 of IAWG (2010). (Raw SCC data
are no longer available.) Dashed line is mean value across models, $21/tCO2. Mean
(median) SCC values for DICE, PAGE, and FUND are $28 ($25), $30 ($12), and $6
($0.5) /tCO2, respectively (IAWG (2010) Tables A3 and A5). Negative SCC values
imply that climate change is net beneficial to society; all are confined to FUND, which
assumes gains in the agricultural sector under moderate warming (Greenstone et al,
2013). Dots show all SCC estimates from the Tol (2008) review with 3% discount
rate, as average values from each study.
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The IAWG’s distribution of SCC values is relatively narrow and consistent with
previous estimates. The distribution with an OMB-required fixed 3% discount rate
is right-skewed with a median of ∼ $12/tCO2, a mean of $21/tCO2, and a 95th per-
centile value of $68/tCO2 (Fig. 1). A 2008 meta-analysis of SCC estimates showed
a similar right-skewed distribution, with values from peer-reviewed studies using a
3% discount rate ranging from $23-119/tCO2 (Tol, 2008). Several studies since 2010
have revisited the IAWG estimates and generally suggested modest increases (e.g.
Johnson and Hope, 2012; Kopp et al, 2012). In 2013, the IAWG used updated model
versions to provide a revised SCC distribution about 50% higher (IAWG (2013), and
see Appendix A for details). Even inclusive of these later studies, the range of SCC
values is narrow enough to appear inconsistent with the widely held view that the
societal consequences of climate change over hundreds of years are highly uncertain.
The IAWG models share one notable feature: although climate damages can be-
come large as a fraction of output, they do not significantly alter economic trajecto-
ries. As an example, we present model output generated with a single IAM, scenario,
and climate sensitivity (the DICE model, IMAGE scenario, and 3◦C/CO2 doubling,
all discussed further in Section 2). The IMAGE scenario posits that without climate
change, the global economy would grow at an average annual rate of 1.3% (1.2%
per capita), yielding per capita income 35 times larger by 2300 (Fig. 2).1 This strong
growth continues even under basecase CO2 emissions and climate change. Although
global mean temperature rises over 6◦C by 2300, accumulation of wealth is only
slightly reduced: per capita income rises by a factor of 30 rather than 35. The persis-
tence of growth in the face of climate change in DICE and similar models has been
noted by other authors, in particular Weitzman (2011).
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Fig. 2: Evolution of per capita GDP (left) and per capita annual GDP growth (right)
from IAWG DICE-IMAGE, without (black) and with (brown) climate change dam-
ages. Left panel includes projected global mean temperature change (red). Right
panel includes annual GDP losses due to climate damages (red).
Persistent growth leads to SCC values likely too low to justify significant action
to mitigate climate change. Spending to benefit much wealthier future generations
1 In the economic scenarios used by the IAWG, average annual growth rates to 2300 range from 1-1.3%
(0.8-1.3% per capita), producing gains in per capita income of 4-6 times by 2100 and 12-40 times by 2300.
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would need an extraordinary high return to be warranted. In the IMAGE example,
with 30x growth by 2300 despite climate change, recommending immediate mitiga-
tion spending would be analogous to asking the average current United States house-
hold, with an annual family income of $50,000, to transfer wealth to a family with an
income of $1.5 million. Comparison to mitigation costs is also informative. The cen-
tral SCC estimate of $21/tCO2 would not likely yield significant transformation of
the electric sector, even if it were taken as a recommended carbon tax, since the 2010
minimum U.S. “price premium” for renewable electricity generation is ∼$22/tCO2
(Johnson and Moyer, 2012).2 (See Section 5 for discussion of optimal taxes). The
IAWG process appears to produce a policy recommendation that would not signifi-
cantly drive technological evolution for emissions reductions.
Continued economic growth in the face of climate change is inconsistent with
many (admittedly qualitative) statements by experts that climate change may have
strongly detrimental effects to human society. This discrepancy suggests that the
models used in the IAWG process may not capture the full range of possible con-
sequences of climate change, i.e. that some aspect of parameter space remains un-
sampled. In this study, we explore which aspects of the IAWG process produce the
apparent robustness in SCC estimates. In particular, we examine one possibility un-
explored by any study, that climate change may directly affect the productivity of the
economy.3
2 DICE and the Interagency SCC Estimation
We focus on one of the three models used in the IAWG process, DICE (Dynamic In-
tegrated Climate-Economy). DICE is an open-source IAM with a long history of use
in studies of the costs of global warming (Nordhaus, 1993, 1994, 2007, 2008). Our
analysis uses the model version modified by the IAWG (“interagency DICE”), which
was based on the 2007 release (“standard DICE”). We examine only DICE because,
of the three IAWG models, it is the only general equilibrium model and therefore
the only one capable of capturing the potential growth impact of climate change that
is the focus of this study. (FUND and PAGE are both partial equilibrium models in
which economic growth is exogenously specified.) DICE is also open source, widely-
known, and based on standard economic theory. For simplicity, we consider only a
single representative socioeconomic trajectory (from IMAGE) and climate sensitivity
(3◦C/CO2 doubling, the median value in the distribution used in the IAWG study),
but the underlying arguments apply generally.
DICE is based on the Solow-Swan growth model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). It
treats the entire world as a single region, with output generated by labor and capital
2 $22/tCO2 is the premium commercial windpower in high-wind onshore sites. Commercial dam-based
hydropower is lower-cost.
3 Fankhauser and Tol (2005) consider the possibility that climate change may have an indirect effect
on productivity and hence growth. In their model, productivity growth is endogenous and is a function of
the labor and capital devoted to R&D. Climate change reduces usable output as in DICE, in turn reducing
savings and the capital available to the R&D sector, slowing growth.
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combined at a prescribed rate of productivity. Economic output is represented by a
standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = At ·N1−αt Kαt (1)
where Yt is total output, Kt is capital, Nt is labor, and At is Total Factor Productiv-
ity, “TFP”. TFP is intended to capture all changes to output that cannot be explained
by changes in labor or capital, and is often envisioned as varying because of tech-
nological change. The parameter α (the elasticity of output with respect to capital)
is set in DICE to 0.3, reflecting broadly accepted estimates for the share of income
going to capital (Acemoglu, 2008). Output per capita, Y/N, is then a function only of
productivity and capital stock per capita:
Yt
Nt
= At · (Kt/Nt)α . (2)
Capital grows through savings and depreciates at an annual rate δ , i.e. capital in one
time period is equal to depreciated capital in the previous period plus savings:
Kt+1 = Kt(1−δ )+ sYt . (3)
The savings rate s is fixed at 22% and δ at 10%.
CO2 emissions follow a fixed path in interagency DICE, in contrast to standard
DICE in which emissions intensity (CO2 per economic activity) is exogenous. Emis-
sions are translated to atmospheric CO2 concentration through a simple 3-box model
of the ocean and atmosphere and a linearized representation of ocean CO2 uptake.
(See for longer discussion of the DICE carbon cycle). Temperature evolution is deter-
mined by the specified climate sensitivity and a simple representation of heat transfer
in the ocean.
The climate-economy feedback loop is closed by allowing temperature change to
affect the economy. Damages from climate change are modeled as a fractional loss D
of annual economic output that is a function of global mean temperature. Equation 1
becomes:
Yt = (1−Dt) ·At ·N1−αt Kαt . (4)
The fractional loss of output D due to climate damages ranges from 0 (no loss) to 1
(loss of all output):
Dt = 1− 11+a2∆T 2t
. (5)
where ∆Tt is the global mean temperature change at time t. The damage parameter a2
is set based on two assumptions: no change in output at 0 ◦ C temperature change and
a 1.8% loss of GDP at a “calibration point” of ∆T = 2.5 ◦C, yielding a2 = .0028388
(Nordhaus, 2007, 2008). The loss estimate of 1.8% is drawn from a meta-analysis
of published climate impacts studies (Nordhaus, 2007, 2008; Nordhaus and Boyer,
2000).
Because the IAWG protocol required that the three IAMs be run with common
scenarios, the IAWG modified DICE, fixing parameters that would ordinarily vary
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and tuning the model to match specified scenarios of economic output and emissions
(2000-2100 forecasts presented at the 2009 Stanford Energy Modeling Forum Ex-
ercise 22; see Clarke and Weyant (2009)). Tuning involved constructing exogenous
productivity (TFP) curves to reproduce the prescribed economic evolution. To extend
scenarios an additional two hundred years to 2300, the IAWG assumed that popula-
tion and GDP growth rates decline linearly from 2100 forward, reaching zero in 2200
and 2300, respectively. The resulting assumptions for the IMAGE scenario are shown
in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3: Three exogenous parameters – population, TFP, and annual CO2 emissions
– and implied carbon emission intensity for the IMAGE scenario. Productivity in-
creases by a factor of 10 between 2000-2300, and emissions intensity falls by a factor
of 44. Cumulative emissions during this timeframe are ∼ 4,600 GtC.
To generate pathways of SCC values over time, each model was run with a base-
case emissions scenario and sequentially with an additional ton of CO2 emissions in
each scenario year. The SCC in year τ is the net present value of the difference be-
tween consumption (output less savings) Cb in the base case and C1 in the case with
additional emissions in year τ:
SCCτ =
T
∑
t=τ
(Cb−C1)t
(1+ r)t
(6)
where r is the discount rate. Because climate damages are assumed nonlinear with
global mean temperature, the SCC rises over time, approximately doubling between
2000 and 2050: damages from an additional ton of CO2 are larger when previous
warming is larger. The IAWG used a fixed discount rate of 3%, required by OMB
guidelines, but also reported results for discount rates of 2.5% and 5%. The 2010 SCC
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value derived in our single-scenario, single-climate-sensitivity analysis is similar to
the value obtained by the IAWG with DICE using a distribution over scenarios and
parameters: $34/tCO2 vs. $28/tCO2 in IAWG (2010).4
3 Robustness of growth in DICE and alternative specifications of climate
damages
In interagency DICE, economic growth continues despite substantial climate dam-
ages because past damages minimally affect economic trajectories. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, economic growth remains positive in the year 2300 even when global mean
temperature rise exceeds 6 ◦C and the annual loss of output is over 10% of GDP. So-
cietal income at this point would have been 35x present without climate change and is
30x present with it, but the bulk of that difference is the 10% annual climate-related
loss of output, which alone would lower income to 31.5x present. The cumulative
effects of two previous centuries of changed climate make a negligible contribution.
Annual climate losses in DICE are comparable to historical major economic
shocks, but the lack of cumulative effects may not be realistic. The Tohoku earth-
quake in March 2011 is estimated to have cost Japan 3.3%-5.2% of GDP in recon-
struction costs (OECD, 2011), and economic contraction in the U.S. during the Great
Depression was 8.6%, 6.5% and 13.1% in the years 1929-30, 1930-31 and 1931-32,
respectively (BEA, 2011). During the Great Depression, economic contractions were
progressive, with each year’s loss evaluated against that of the previous year, so that
by 1931-32, output was more than 25% lower than in 1928-29. In DICE, by contrast,
climate damages in a given year propagate only weakly into the future.
Weak propagation of climate damages in DICE occurs because damages are ap-
plied only to output, and can affect growth only indirectly, through two pathways.
First, the growth rate dY/dt includes a small term (dD/(1−D))/dt related to year-
over-year fractional changes in the damages themselves, which increase as warming
progresses. Second, climate damages lower savings, because savings are a fixed per-
centage of output. Harm from climate change reduces capital available in future years,
lowering output in those years. Neither effect is large, however.
We test the robustness of growth in DICE by increasing the magnitude of climate
damages to highly unlikely values, setting losses at the 2.5 ◦C calibration point to
15% and 30% of GDP rather than the default 1.8% (Fig. 4a-b). The most extreme
value used is over six times the maximum of the IPCC’s estimated plausible range
of damages (Pachauri, 2007) and yields annual climate-related losses of over 70% of
GDP by 2300. Even these catastrophic losses do not cause economic contraction. The
assumed exogenous factors driving growth in DICE outweigh any plausible effects
of climate change.
The robustness of growth in DICE suggests that the specification of climate dam-
ages may not reflect the full range of possible harms. The model has only four pa-
rameters that can be affected by climate change: output Y , capital K, labor N, and
productivity A. In DICE, damages affect only output. Several previous authors have
4 Interagency DICE uses 10-year timesteps beginning with 2005, so our stated 2010 SCC value is the
average of 2005 and 2015. The IAWG “central” value of $21/tCO2 averages estimates from all models.
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tested alternative representations of climate damages, including applying them to cap-
ital (e.g. Ackerman et al, 2010; Kopp et al, 2012), but all yield economies that grow
in the face of large climate damages. We consider the possibility that climate change
may reduce productivity growth. While the literature on climate change and technol-
ogy includes many studies that consider how endogenously represented technological
changes may affect climate (e.g. by promoting the development of low-emission en-
ergy sources; for examples see Acemoglu et al, 2012; Gillingham et al, 2008; Popp,
2004), no studies have considered the inverse problem, how climate change may di-
rectly affect productivity.
Research suggests that TFP levels can be partially explained by human capital
accumulation, by the quality of government services, and by investment in R&D, all
of which may be affected by climate change. (See reviews in Acemoglu, 2008; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). Some authors have argued that permanent losses of ecosys-
tems and the use of capital and labor on adaptation instead of R&D may directly
reduce growth rates (e.g. Pindyck, 2011, 2012). In a world where climate change
causes losses to output, people may also reduce investments in areas that would have
led to greater future output (e.g. education, health care, or public goods), yielding
future productivity lower than in a world with no climate change. This indirect effect
is analogous to the compounding impact of output losses to the capital stock. (See
also Fankhauser and Tol, 2005). DICE cannot capture this effect because it does not
allow savings to affect TFP, which is entirely exogenous.
The empirical evidence on the impact of climate change on productivity is lim-
ited but suggestive. Although temporary weather shocks are not exactly analogous
to long-term climate changes, they can inform modeling of climate-related damages.
Dell et al (2012) find that temperature shocks lead to several years of lower eco-
nomic growth in low-income countries, affecting agricultural yields, industrial out-
put, and political institutions, and reducing growth rates temporarily by ∼1.3 per-
centage points per ◦C temperature rise. Bansal and Ochoa (2011) find that national
temperature shocks reduce growth by 0.9 percentage points per ◦C. Jones and Olken
(2010) concur in finding reduced growth in agricultural and light manufacturing ex-
ports from poor countries after temperature increases. Of course, for longer-term cli-
mate changes, adaptation should result in smaller adverse impacts than those ob-
served after short-term weather events. Still, Dell et al (2009) suggest that only half
of the negative short-term impacts of temperature shocks are offset in the long run
through adaptation.
In this work, we do not try to estimate how damages from climate change will
affect TFP, if at all. Instead, we explore the sensitivity of the SCC estimate to the
implicit assumption in DICE that damages do not affect TFP. To demonstrate the
possible size of the effects, we examine the consequences of two formulations. First,
we consider a damage function that imposes a fraction of annual damages on pro-
ductivity (and the rest on output) but keeps the year-on-year damages for any given
change in temperature the same as in the DICE formulation. Climate damages there-
fore reduce the level of TFP in any given year. Second, we consider a damage func-
tion motivated by a well-known endogenous growth model in which TFP growth is
determined by the allocation of labor to inventing or manufacturing (Romer, 1990).
Climate damages therefore reduce the growth rate of TFP. In both cases, climate ef-
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fects on growth are negative. We do not consider the possibilities suggested by some
authors, that investment in R&D could drive growth that counteract climate damages
(Miao and Popp, 2013) or that natural disasters stimulate innovations and actually
produce net growth (Skidmore and Toya, 2002). We explore only that part of the un-
certainty in SCC values associated with the plausible possibility that climate change
may negatively impact TFP.
3.1 Damages to TFP levels
In our first formulation, we allow a fraction of damages to reduce productivity rather
than output. We solve for the implicit growth rate of TFP (gAt ) in the exogenously
specified path At according to
At+1 = (1+gAt) ·At . (7)
We then allow a fraction f of damages to reduce TFP instead of decreasing output.
That is, we specify a new path of TFP, A∗t , that is reduced by climate damages:
A∗t+1 = (1− f ·Dt)(1+gAt) ·A∗t (8)
where A∗0 = A0. The remainder of damages fall on output. Setting DtY = 1− (1−Dt )(1− f ·Dt ) ,
output equals
Yt = (1−DtY ) ·A∗t ·N1−αt Kαt .
This modification yields the same single-period fractional loss in consumption (1−
Dt ) as in the original specification. The trajectory of economic output is however
highly sensitive to assumptions. Applying even a small fraction f of damages to TFP
eventually produces negative growth rates, and applying 25% of damages to TFP
causes economic collapse within the analysis timeframe (Fig. 4b-c).
3.2 Damages to TFP growth rates
As a second possibility, we consider a formulation of damages motivated by Romer
(1990). That model contains two sectors, an inventing sector and a manufacturing
sector; output of the former increases productivity of the latter. We allow damages to
apply to both sectors equally. Damages then affect the economy in two ways: they
reduce output of the manufacturing sector the same way they do in DICE – Equation
4 still holds – and they reduce output from the inventing sector, which reduces the
growth rate of TFP according to
A∗t+1 = (1+gAt(1−Dt)) ·A∗t . (9)
This damage function is almost the same as that used by Pindyck (2011, 2012). (See
Appendix B for derivation.) With this formulation, the DICE climate damages signif-
icantly reduce economic growth (Fig. 4b-c, dashed line). During the 300-year time
period of our analysis, the effect is roughly similar to applying f = 5% of damages
10 E.J. Moyer et al.
to TFP in Equation 8. Note that with the formulation of Equation 9, as opposed to
that of Equation 8, growth in TFP can vanish but the TFP level cannot shrink, mean-
ing climate change cannot produce a severe economic contraction. Equation 9 may
therefore not capture all potential behavior of the climate and economic system. Nev-
ertheless, it is informative that climate impacts on TFP can be a natural consequence
of standard economic models.
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Fig. 4: Per capita economic output (left) and growth rates (right) in interagency DICE-
IMAGE with a variety of climate damages representations. The no-climate-change
case is repeated in black. (a-b): varying damages magnitude at 2.5 ◦C calibration
point. Default IAWG value of 1.8% in brown. (c-d): damages applied to the TFP level
and TFP growth rate. (e-f): repeat of c-d with modified model (endogenous emissions
and improved carbon cycle). Model modifications produce slightly lower economic
output in all but catastrophic cases, where reduced CO2 emissions moderate climate
change and reduce losses instead.
Climate effects on growth and the SCC 11
3.3 Model adjustments required if climate change reduces growth
The assumption that climate change does not reduce growth is so ingrained in intera-
gency DICE that the model contains three features that become unrealistic if growth
is significantly reduced by climate damages. First, a fixed emissions pathway means
that if the economy declines, emissions intensity (CO2/GDP) can increase to implau-
sible values. Second, a fixed discount rate is inconsistent with theories of the proper
discount rate, which should be sensitive to economic growth. Finally, the DICE car-
bon cycle model is valid only on short (decadal) timescales and removes atmospheric
CO2 too quickly thereafter. If the discount rate is low because of low growth rates,
longer timescales matter. The first of these features would tend to increase SCC val-
ues; the second two to decrease them. We therefore adjust the model to correct these
unrealistic assumptions and recalculate economic trajectories (Fig. 4e-f, which repeat
the cases shown in Fig. 4c-d). (For detailed discussion, see Appendices C and D.)
Economic evolution remains broadly similar in the modified model, since reduced
CO2 emissions under economic decline are offset by slower ocean uptake of CO2.
Different damage formulations still produce a wide range of economic outcomes.
4 Comparison of SCC estimates
The varying economic outcomes with different treatments of climate damages pro-
duce SCC values that span many orders of magnitude (Table 1 and Fig. 5). Because
the SCC is also sensitive to the choice of discount rate, a controversial issue, we show
SCC calculated with two choices of discount rate parameters: values consistent with
the discussion in IAWG (2010), and values used in Stern report (Stern, 2007) (Param-
eters are η = 2, ρ = 1.5%/yr and η = 1, ρ = 0.1%/yr, respectively, in the Ramsey
equation rt = η ·gt +ρ , where gt is the growth rate. See Appendix E for discussion.)
For either discounting case, the resulting range of SCC values is much larger than
in previous studies (e.g. Johnson and Hope, 2012; Kopp et al, 2012; Tol, 2008). As
we have retained the same functional form for the magnitude of climate damages,
this range reflects only uncertainty about how damages affect growth. Other authors
have discussed alternate functional forms for damages (e.g. Ackerman et al, 2010;
Kopp et al, 2012; Weitzman, 2009, 2011). Including those changes would increase
the range of SCC values still further.
The results of this exercise suggest that uncertainty in SCC values due to treat-
ment of damages is comparable to that due to treatment of discounting. SCC values
rise approximately exponentially with fraction of damages to TFP. The rate of rise
depends on η , with higher η producing greater sensitivity to damage assumptions:
when damages are low and growth rates positive, harms to future generations are
weighted less; when the economy contracts, harms to future generations are weighted
more (Fig. 5). In all cases with damages to TFP levels, growth rates become negative
and either produce negative discount rates or would do so if the analysis timeframe
were extended. Once the discount rate is negative, the present value of future dam-
ages grows exponentially with the time until damages occur. The exact SCC value is
therefore an artifact of the time horizon of the analysis and would increase with the
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Damages treatment 2010 SCC Value ($2007/tCO2)
IAWG model Modified model Modified model
fixed discounting η = 2, ρ = 1% η = 1, ρ = 0.1%
DICE damages 34 16 210
1% damages to TFP level 51 22 440
5% damages to TFP level 110 54 1,300
Damages to TFP growth rate 160 72 1,500
10% damages to TFP level 160 130 2,200
25% damages to TFP level 250 1,600 4,800
50% damages to TFP level 320 100,000 8,000
Table 1: Selected 2010 SCC estimates from unmodified and modified interagency
DICE-IMAGE (climate sensitivity 3◦C/CO2 doubling), under different formulations
of climate damages and assumptions about discounting. Discounting with η = 2,
ρ = 1%/yr produces greater sensitivity to damage treatment. With DICE damages,
SCC is lower than in the fixed-discounting case because the endogenous discount rate
is initially larger than 3%. Cases with damages to TFP eventually produce negative
discount rates, so SCC estimates would grow if analysis were extended past 2300.
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Fig. 5: The 2010 SCC from modified DICE under varying assumptions regarding
damages to productivity, for two alternate specifications of discount rate: η = 2 and
ρ = 1% (solid) and η = 1, ρ = 0.1% (dashed). The SCC rises exponentially with
greater climate impacts to the determinants of growth. Higher η produces higher
SCC values in simulations dominated by negative growth rates, because future harms
are weighted more.
length of time considered. The SCC values we show are several orders of magnitude
higher than IAWG estimates, but even so are limited by termination of the analysis in
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2300. Very high SCC values indicate large potential harms from climate change, but
are difficult to interpret quantitatively.
The extreme cases of climate-related damages that we explore may not be real-
istic, as neither standard nor interagency DICE contains the flexibility to represent
behavior in circumstances of economic contraction. Adjustments to savings rates do
not alter the qualitative results, but our simple damage formulation may not real-
istically capture economic consequences given adaptive actions. The work here is
simply an exploration of uncertainty across possible parameter values in the simple
IAM frameworks commonly used. The importance of growth effects means that more
realistic representations are needed.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Our results imply that the SCC is far more uncertain than shown in the IAWG re-
port or in previous modeling exercises, and that narrow distributions appear to be an
artifact of model assumptions. Prior models do not allow the SCC to affect growth
(except indirectly) and the SCC is sensitive to this restriction. While we take no view
on whether climate change will affect growth, it is not likely that these effects can be
ruled out a priori, and they should not be precluded by choices made in the structure
of the model. If climate change reduces TFP levels or growth rate, the direction of
the changes in the SCC value are uniformly upward. It is therefore possible that the
SCC was underestimated by the IAWG and by previous studies.
In the model studied here, even a modest impact of climate damages on produc-
tivity can cause the SCC to grow so large as to limit its usefulness as a guide to
policymaking. The SCC is evaluated under business-as-usual assumptions, which as-
sume no policy-driven mitigation. Incremental damages will be maximal in this case,
because incremental losses grow with the degree of climate change. A large SCC
value signifies large potential gains from mitigation, but if current mitigation is far
from optimal, the SCC would exceed the value of a carbon tax in the context of a
comprehensive policy. The optimal carbon tax is set instead to that point where the
marginal mitigation costs are equal to the marginal benefits of reduced harms from
climate change.5 In the case of very high SCC values, formulating regulatory pol-
icy based on the SCC rather than the optimal tax would impose undue costs. (No
sensible policymaker, for example, would apply an SCC value of $100,000/tCO2 in
cost-benefit analysis if all emissions could be eliminated for $100/tCO2.)
Understanding how interactions between climate change and economic growth
produce uncertainty in the SCC provides insight into past controversies over the ap-
propriate choice of discount rate. Proponents of an “empirical” discount rate argue
for use of values similar to observed market rates while proponents of an “ethical”
discount rate argue for lower values to place greater weight on the welfare of fu-
ture generations. Our results suggest that the roots of the dispute may lie not in the
principles of discounting but in differing implicit assumptions about climate dam-
ages combined with counterintuitive IAM behavior. A 3% discount rate means that
5 The optimal carbon tax would be estimated by an analysis in which mitigation efforts are incremen-
tally increased until the cost of any additional mitigation no longer exceeds the resulting additional benefit.
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harms after 2100 are essentially disregarded. But it is not unethical to disregard cli-
mate harms to future generations if those harms are small. The SCC values from the
IAWG process are not unreasonable if the assumptions in the IAWG models are true,
and future generations are many times richer despite climate change. If impacts are
catastrophic instead, then standard economic analysis would indicate a low discount
rate and would produce a recommendation of significant policy action. (See review
in Kaplow et al, 2010). In this study, SCC values become very high if climate change
reduces future wealth significantly by reducing the growth rate. It is possible that the
debate over discounting results not from a difference in ethics but from an unrecog-
nized dispute over the treatment of climate impacts.
Finally, our results suggest that the greatest uncertainty in the cost of climate
change may lie not in the magnitude of losses at any given time but in how those
losses affect growth. DICE damage magnitudes are broadly consistent with the esti-
mate in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report that a temperature change of 4 ◦C would
cause global mean losses between 1 and 5% of GDP (Pachauri, 2007). Both the phys-
ical and social science communities have shown increasing interest in studying poten-
tial climate impacts, and many current studies focus on better quantifying economic
losses. Our exploration of SCC sensitivities suggests that a higher research priority
should be understanding how those losses relate to growth. The importance of growth
is well understood more generally; even small differences in growth rates can produce
large differences in wellbeing over time. As in the rest of economics, growth effects
may be the predominant factor governing the impacts of climate change.
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A 2013 update to the IAWG social cost of carbon estimates
The U.S. government’s Interagency Working Group on the social cost of carbon re-
leased an updated set of SCC estimates in May 2013 IAWG (2013). The IAWG re-
calculated SCC values using updated versions of all three IAMs used in the original
study (DICE, FUND, and PAGE), based new code releases by the models’ original
authors. The IAWG did not make any changes regarding the discount rates or method
of discounting, the basecase economic scenarios (economic growth, population, and
emissions), or climate sensitivity. Comparing SCC estimates between the two stud-
ies is made somewhat complicated by the fact that the SCC grows over time and the
IAWG reported values for the year 2010 in the original report and for the year 2020
in the update. In the original report, SCC values grow by ∼20% between 2010 and
2020. The new report provides a distribution of 2020 SCC estimates in which the
central and 95th percentile estimates are roughly 60% higher than the original 2010
values, implying a modest real increase in SCC values (Figure 6). The change does
not qualitatively impact the conclusions and recommendations of this study. Model
changes are summarized in detail, below.
Fig. 6: Histogram of SCC estimates from the 2010 IAWG report (blue) and 2013
IAWG update (red) for the 3% discount rate case. Estimates sample across socioeco-
nomic scenarios and climate sensitivity values. Values are digitized from Figure A8
of IAWG (2010) and from an un-numbered figure on p. 14 of IAWG (2013).
The interagency DICE model was updated to reflect changes that appeared in the
2010 standard DICE version. Changes included a damage function that represents
sea level rise separately from all other damages, and adjusted values for the carbon
cycle model. The carbon model in the 2010 version of DICE is based on the same
set of linear equations as the 2007 version, but uses a revised set of parameters. The
new parameter values were calibrated to decrease the carbon uptake by the ocean,
resulting in higher atmospheric carbon concentrations. We tested the new parameter
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values in the original IAWG DICE model and confirmed that they result in slightly
higher carbon concentrations. However, the carbon cycle changes do not prevent the
excessive long-term uptake rates discussed in Section 5.3 and Glotter et al (2013),
which result from failure to incorporate nonlinear ocean chemistry.
The new DICE damage function decomposes damages into two parts: one specific
to sea level rise and one representing all other damages. Both of these of the new
component damage functions model economic damages as a quadratic function of
temperature change, as in the 2007 version. According to IAWG (2013), the effect
of the change to the damage function is to increase overall damages slightly in the
short-run, decrease them in the medium-term, and increase them in the long-term.
After discounting, the impact of this revision is to decrease the SCC.
The FUND model was revised to reflect new features in version 3.8. Changes in-
clude revised damage functions for sea level rise, the agricultural sector, and space
heating demand; adjusted speed of temperature response to increased GHG concen-
trations; and addition of indirect effects of methane emissions.
The PAGE model was updated based on the 2009 model version. Changes in-
clude a separate representation of damages from sea level rise, an upper bound on the
magnitude of damages, a revised method for scaling damages at the regional level, a
probabilistic treatment of passing a climate threshold beyond which society suffers
extreme economic damages, and revised assumptions about the rate and magnitude
of adaptation to climate change.
Because the SCC is an average of the outputs of all 3 IAMs, all model changes
impacted the reported SCC estimates.
B Romer model with climate damages to two sectors
In standard and interagency DICE, technological change is exogenously specified,
and this specification drives the growth of the economy. Under this specification, even
massive damages from climate change have little effect on long term growth if they
merely reduce usable output. (See main text.) We consider how climate change dam-
ages would affect long-term growth in the framework of the simplest possible model
of endogenous technical change, the model developed in Romer (1990). (We closely
follow the statement of the model in Aghion and Howitt (2009).) In this model, the
economy is divided into two sectors. A manufacturing sector uses labor and ma-
chines (or ideas) to produce usable output under conditions of perfect competition. A
research or inventing sector produces machines or ideas that contribute to the manu-
facturing sector. The greater the variety of machines or ideas, the more efficient the
manufacturing sector, so productivity arises as a function of market activities rather
than being specified exogenously. We modify the model so that damages from cli-
mate change affect both the manufacturing and research sectors and consider how
these damages affect growth.
As Romer discusses, the structure of the Romer (1990) model is closely related
to that of the Solow-Swan model, which is used in DICE. Nevertheless, some of the
assumptions may differ so the two are not directly comparable. We use the Romer
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(1990) model to motivate a damage function in DICE rather than as a formal deriva-
tion of such a function.
As a demonstration, we consider first a simple case where output is produced by
the combination of labor and research in which research is a constant fraction γ of the
economy. Research is represented by the sum of the total designs or ideas x indexed
by i. This sum is combined with labor, L, and the output is reduced by harms from
climate change leading to an output of:
yt = (1−D)L
∫ t
0
xidi, (10)
where damages D are as in DICE. If research is a constant fraction γ of the economy,
we can write xt = γyt . The change in income over time is:
dyt
dt
= (1−D)Lγyt , (11)
and the growth rate is reduced by climate damages:
gt =
dyt/dt
yt
= (1−D)Lγ. (12)
Thus, even in a very simple model, the growth rate can be reduced by harms from
climate change.
The simple model above assumes that the fraction of the economy devoted to
research is fixed, but the Romer (1990) model endogenizes this choice. In a world
with climate change, the research sector may grow (or shrink) in response to that
change. To check that the intuitions from the simple case considered above carry over,
we turn to a modification of Romer (1990) to include harms from climate change.
We use the same objective function and utility function used in DICE (restated
here in continuous time for simplicity):
W =
∫ ∞
0
c1−ηt
1−η e
−ρtdt, (13)
where η is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and ρ is the pure rate
of time preference. Given this structure of preferences, the interest rate r must follow
the Euler equation:
g =
r−ρ
η
, (14)
where g is the growth rate of GDP.
DICE assumes that there is a single economic sector that combines capital and
labor at productivity rate At to produce a final consumption good. Following Romer,
we alter this assumption so that there are two sectors to the economy, a manufacturing
sector which produces a final consumption good and a research sector which produces
an intermediate good used in the production of the final good. The final good is the
numeraire with price 1. Production of the intermediate good uses the final good as
an input (along with labor) with units set so one unit of the final good is required to
produce one unit of the intermediate good.
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The intermediate good can be thought of as machines, blueprints, ideas, patents,
or any other input into the production of the final good. We index the intermediate
inputs i in the interval [0,At ] where At is the measure of the total number of interme-
diate good at time t. At is a measure of the variety of intermediate goods. A producer
of an intermediate good is given a monopoly or a patent over that good but there is
free entry into the research sector so expected profits are zero.
We assume that there is a fixed pool of labor divided into the final good sector (L1)
and the research sector (L2). Total labor is L= L1+L2. The restriction to a fixed pool
of labor is not present in DICE. Although this assumption can be relaxed, following
Jones (1995), for simplicity we retain the assumption here. We let damages reduce
usable output as in DICE.
The production function for the final good combines labor (with share 1−α) and
the intermediate sector:
Yt = (1−D)L1−α1
∫ At
0
xαi di. (15)
α ∈ [0,1], and each xi is the amount of intermediate product i used as input.
To see the relationship of this model to DICE, denote Xt as the total amount
of the final good used to produce intermediate goods. Xt must be equal to the total
intermediate output:
Xt =
∫ At
0
xidi. (16)
Under the assumption that an equal amount of each intermediate good i is used
(shown to be true below), we can write x = Xt/At . Final output at time t is:
Yt = (1−D)AtL1−α1 xα , (17)
which closely resembles the production function in DICE except that the intermediate
goods x function as the capital input.
GDP at time t is the output less the amount used to produce the intermediate
good:
GDPt = At
[
(1−D)L1−α1 xα − x
]
. (18)
The resulting growth rate along the balanced growth path is:
g =
1
At
dAt
dt
. (19)
Our goal is to understand how damages from climate change reduce the growth rate
of At , which is equivalent to understanding how they affect g. To do this, we write g
in terms of the primitives of the model.
Start by solving for the production of the intermediate good. A producer of an
intermediate good will maximize profits:
Πi = pixi− xi, (20)
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where pi is the price of the intermediate good i and recalling that the final good is
used as an input to production of the intermediate good but that the price of a final
good is equal to the price of one intermediate good. That is revenue is price times
quantity and cost is equal to output given the one-for-one technology. The price pi
will be equal to the marginal product of the good in the final sector.
pi =
∂Yt
∂xi
= (1−D)αL1−α1 xα−1i . (21)
Substituting, we get
Πi = (1−D)αL1−α1 xαi − xi. (22)
The monopolist researcher chooses xi to maximize this expression. The first order
condition is
∂Πi
∂xi
= (1−D)α2L1−α1 xα−1i −1 = 0. (23)
The profit maximizing quantity therefore is
xi = (1−D) 11−α L1α 21−α . (24)
It follows that the equilibrium quantity will be the same in every sector i, so we can
drop the subscripts where convenient. The equilibrium profit flow is:
Π =
1−α
α
x. (25)
The key modeling choice made by Romer is that the growth of the output of the
research sector grows in proportion to the existing stock in that sector, creating knowl-
edge spillovers. If there is a constant productivity in the research sector of λ , Romer
writes dAt/dt = λL2At . The key question here is whether climate change reduces the
flow of research or intermediate machines over time. We impose an assumption that
climate change reduces the flow of research similarly to how it reduces usable output.
That is, we assume that climate change hurts both sectors of the economy. Therefore,
the stock of intermediate machines evolves according to:
dAt/dt = (1−D)λL2At . (26)
Because the research sector is monopolistically competitive (there is free entry),
the flow of profits must be zero. If the wage rate paid to researchers is wt the flow of
profits to the research sector is
Π
r
(1−D)λAtL2−wtL2 = 0. (27)
The first term is the output of the the sector, (1−D)λAtL2, multiplied by the price of
each machine or idea (the present value of profits, Π/r). Solving,
r = (1−D)λAtΠ/wt . (28)
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We need to solve for the equilibrium wage rate. This will be equal to the marginal
product of labor, so we get:
wt =
∂Yt
∂L1
= (1−D)(1−α)L−α1 Atxα . (29)
Using equation (24), we get
wt = (1−D) 11−α (1−α)α 2α1−α At . (30)
Substituting, we get an expression for the interest rate:
r = (1−D)λL1α. (31)
Since
g =
1
At
dAt
dt
= (1−D)λL2 = (1−D)λ (L−L1), (32)
we get
r = α [g− (1−D)λL] , (33)
and substituting this expression into the Euler equation (14) we get
g =
αλL(1−D)−ρ
α+η
. (34)
Climate damages in this formulation reduce the growth rate. The key assumption
is that they reduce the flow of output in the research sector in exactly the same way
that they reduce the flow of output in the manufacturing sector. If we allow harms to
the research sector to differ, the model would be identical except that equation (34)
would be reduced by a different damage function (1−D2) where D2 can be different
from D. We have no views on the appropriate damage function in the research sector
and impose the same damage function merely as a baseline.
The damage function used in the text is based on equation (34). Recall that we
want an expression for the growth rate of At , but this is just g in this model. We
simplify by setting ρ = 0. The growth rate of At is then reduced by the damages
(1−D), as we specified in the text. Moreover, output is also reduced by damages, as
in equation (15).
C Model modification: endogenous emissions
The IAWG process specified fixed emissions paths decoupled from actual economic
performance. (In the IMAGE scenario, emissions increase for ∼150 years and de-
cline thereafter, presumably driven by some assumed technological change). If the
economy in a model simulation declines, however, retaining a fixed path of emis-
sions would imply that people use more energy per unit of output, or that the energy
they use is more carbon intensive. In cases of steep economic decline, assumptions
of fixed emissions may reverse the sign of implied technological change and imply
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an increasing rather than decreasing emissions intensity. For example, in a damages
formulation where 50% of damages apply to TFP, assuming a fixed emissions path
means that implied emissions intensity rises by approximately a factor of five by the
year 2150 (Figure 7a). This result does not appear to be intended by the IAWG, and it
appears to arise only in scenarios they did not consider. Using exogenous emissions
in simulations with economic decline would lead to overstating the SCC because
emissions continue their basecase evolution even if the economy contracts, leading
to sustained high climate damages.
To avoid this problem, we assume a fixed trajectory of emissions intensity rather
than emissions, deriving it from the basecase runs in the IAWG model (which has
ktC/GDP dropping from a current rate of 0.18 to 0.04 in 2100). We then calculate
emissions endogenously based on economic activity in a given scenario and the as-
sumed emissions intensity. In cases where a high percentage of damages apply to
TFP, the difference is significant: in the example above, adjusted carbon emissions in
the year 2100 are approximately half those in the basecase emissions path.
We take no position on the plausibility of the emissions pathway itself, which
implies that CO2 emissions would decline steeply even in the absence of mitigation
policies. As the purpose of this study is to examine only the effects of climate impacts
on growth, and IAWG emissions scenarios are broadly similar, we simply take the
IMAGE scenario as fixed. Uncertainty in the pathway of technological change would
produce additional uncertainty in SCC values.
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(a) Emission intensity assumptions
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Fig. 7: Emissions intensity (left) and annual emission levels (right), under alterna-
tive modeling assumptions. Interagency DICE assumes an exogenous emission level
(solid brown, right), yielding an implied emissions intensity (solid brown, left). Em-
ploying a fixed emissions path under alternative damage scenarios leads to differ-
ing implied emissions intensities (solid green and solid orange, left panel). Alterna-
tively, we fix emissions intensity (dashed brown, left) and derive implied endogenous
emissions for the various damage scenarios shown (dashed green and dashed orange,
right). This formulation is consistent with the original DICE model.
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D Model modification: physical carbon cycle
IAMs that do not produce economic contraction need only a rudimentary represen-
tation of the physical climate system. Persistent growth would indicate use of a high
discount rate in SCC calculations, making long-term climate changes irrelevant be-
cause long-term harms are disregarded in the analysis. If however climate losses in
an IAM produce low or even negative growth rates and resulting low or negative en-
dogenous discount rates, the modeled climate representation must remain accurate
at long timescales, because the effects of climate change in the distant future matter.
The carbon cycle in standard and interagency DICE approximates real-world physics
only on short timescales: it provides reasonable representation for about 50 years but
then deviates strongly from the predictions of state-of-the-art coupled climate mod-
els. Atmospheric CO2 perturbations in DICE disappear within centuries while larger
models show them persisting on the order of 10,000 years (Archer et al, 2009; Glot-
ter et al, 2013). Adjustment of the carbon cycle parameters in the 2010 DICE update
used in IAWG (2013) do not fix this fundamental issue.
Errors in CO2 evolution arise in DICE because the model uses a linear representa-
tion of ocean carbon uptake. In the real world, ocean carbonate chemistry makes CO2
uptake nonlinear. At present, the ocean contains over 100 times as much dissolved in-
organic carbon as would be indicated by the solubility of CO2 itself, primarily in the
form of bicarbonate (HCO−3 ) and to a lesser degree carbonate (CO
=
3 ). As the ocean
acidifies in response to CO2 uptake, the partitioning shifts toward CO2, reducing the
oceans’ ability to store carbon and slowing uptake (Revelle and Suess, 1957). With-
out this nonlinear chemistry, the DICE carbon cycle produces too-rapid removal of
atmospheric CO2 perturbations. For the IMAGE emissions scenario, the 2007 DICE
carbon cycle model yields a rise in atmospheric CO2 concentrations by the year 2300
only a third as large as would be predicted by more realistic models (Figure 8a). DICE
underestimates CO2 in 2300 by over 1000 ppm and warming by nearly 3◦C (Figure
8b). To correct this problem, we use a simple carbon cycle model based on Bolin and
Eriksson (1959) with nonlinear chemistry as described in Revelle and Suess (1957).
The “BEAM” (Bolin and Eriksson Adjusted Model) representation is described and
validated in Glotter et al (2013).
E Endogenous discounting in modified IAWG-DICE
The IAWG protocol specified a fixed discount rate of 3% following OMB guidelines
(Circular A-4, which prescribes the required procedures for cost-benefit analysis).
However, a requirement of a fixed, exogenous discount rate does not make sense if
growth declines substantially or is negative because of harms from climate change.
Although there is significant dispute about discounting in climate change policy as-
sessments (see summary in Kaplow et al, 2010), under all formulations, a higher
growth rate implies a higher discount rate and a lower growth rate implies a lower
one.
The implied interest rate in the standard DICE model is given by the Ramsey
equation:
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Fig. 8: Carbon dioxide concentration (a) and global mean temperature change (b) us-
ing the BEAM (dashed) and DICE (solid) carbon cycle models in interagency DICE-
IMAGE. The DICE CO2 trajectory and resulting projected temperature anomalies
vary substantially from those produced with the more physically realistic BEAM.
Temperature change in DICE is benchmarked from the pre-industrial, so the year
2000 already experiences ∼ 0.8◦C global temperature rise.
rt = η ·gt +ρ, (35)
where η is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, gt is the growth rate in
the economy, and ρ is the pure rate of time preference (i.e., the discount rate applied
to utility for purposes of social welfare maximization). Commentators differ widely
on how to set η and ρ, but all agree that a lower growth rate should imply a lower
discount rate. A fixed 3% discount rate when growth is low or negative is unlikely to
reflect the implied discount rate in DICE for any reasonable choice of η and ρ . We
therefore use equation 35 to compute an endogenous discount rate.
The choice of values for η and ρ is controversial, and we take no view on the cor-
rect values here. We consider two options. The first sets η = 2 and ρ = 1%/yr, values
consistent with many previous studies. (See discussion on p. 21-23 of IAWG (2010);
standard DICE (Nordhaus, 2007) uses η = 2 and ρ = 1.5%/yr.) As an alternative, we
consider the lower values used in the Stern Report: η = 1 and ρ = 0.1%/yr (Stern,
2007). We show the effect of both choices on SCC estimates in Figure 5.
The two discounting parameter choices bracket the OMB-required 3% discount
rate when applied to the basecase economic trajectories. Basecase economic growth
under DICE damages (Figure 2) involves growth rate slowing from 2.2%-0% in the
two centuries from 2000-2300. Resulting discount rates would evolve from 5.4%-1%
using the higher η and ρ values and from 2.3%-0.1% using the lower ones.
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